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NOTES
ADMISSIBILITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY
EAVESDROPPING THROUGH THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES1

In general, the purpose of this note is to discuss the admissibility in
courts of evidence secured by federal law enforcement officials
federal
the
by eavesdropping, through the media of mechanical and electrical devices
which have been placed on or near the premises of the accused. The
problem lends itself well to the historical approach. The note will begin
with a brief analysis of the common law, then will consider federal court
decisions rendered prior to the enactment of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, followed by a study of the federal court decisions under this
Act, and will conclude with a somewhat speculative treatment of the
application of the federal law to the State of Wyoming.
1.

Illustrative of such mechanical and electrical devices are detectaphones, dictaphones,
vacuum tubes, induction coils, microphones, wire, tape and a sound recorders,
telephone extension lines, and "walky-talkies."

(89]
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I
AT COMMON LAw

At common law, although evidence may have been illegally taken from
the possession of the party against whom it was offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this was no valid objection to its admissibility if it was
relevant to the issues "the court will not take notice how it was
obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it form an issue to
determine that question." 2 The reason underlying the rule seems to have
been that since the objective of the judge and jury is to get at the truth,
all relevant evidence should be admitted. For example, a trespasser may
testify to pertinent facts observed by him, or he may put in evidence
pertinent articles found by him while trespassing; but for the trespass
he may be held liable in a civil suit. Moreover, evidence obtained by
eavesdropping, although an offense at common law, was nevertheless
admissible if relevant. 8
The common law rule has been modified in the United States courts
to the extent only of excluding evidence, in a civil or criminal case, which
is procured by federal officers in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 4 to the Constitution of the United States. This common law rule,
as modified, is still the prevailing rule in the federal courts. When federal
officers violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to get at the truth, the
federal courts refuse to admit evidence so obtained, regarding the upholding
of the constiutional guaranties against abuse of governmental power as
more important in such circumstances than the discovery of the truth.5
But, since the protection to the individual under the Fifth Amendment
is "from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness," 6
seldom is the Fifth Amendment, standing alone, invoked in this type of
case as a bar to the admission of such evidence. Thus the problem in its
commonest form stems from this principle: that according to the common
law as modified in the federal courts, where the unlawful procurement
consists of a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the illegality of the
search will exclude the evidence so obtained.
2.

3.

1 Greenleaf on Evidence 254 a (15th ed. 1892); See also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 467, 48 S. Ct. 569, 72 L. Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 385 (1928); 8 Wigmore on
Evidence sec. 2184 b (3d ed. 1940); United States v. Scottie, 102 F. Supp. 747, 750
(DCSD Texas 1950).
For general support of this and the previous proposition see Commonwealth v.
Tibbets, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N.E. 910, 911 (1893); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc.
329, 337 (Mass. 1841); People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (1903);

4.

6.

On the admissibility of
Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624, 625 (1897).
evidence secured through eavesdropping, see People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874).
The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." The Fifth Amendment reads: ". . . nor
shall (any person) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ....
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, 751, 752 (1886);
Brady v. United States, 300 F. 540, 541 (CCA 6th 1924).
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S. CL 1248, 1251, 88 L. Sd. 1542 (1944).

Norrn
II
DEcisIoNs

PRIOR TO THE COMMUNICATIONS Acr OF 1934

With the invention of modern communications devices which enable
an eavesdropper secretly to overhear and record conservations, the common
law rule began to undergo modification. The question of whether or not
wire tapping (a form of eavesdropping by mechanical means) constitutes
an unlawful search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was first presented in the leading case of Olmstead v. United States,7 in which case the Supreme Court held
that wire tapping does not constitute an unlawful search and seizure.
As is characteristic of practically- all areas of constitutional law, the
Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of balancing interests
and weighing values; in this case, the individual's right to privacy against
the need for effective detection of criminals. The following excerpts and
paraphrases can serve to illustrate the judicial reasoning on both sides of
the question. Although four of the justices vigorously dissented, the
majority of the court held s that:
"Here we have testimony only of voluntary conversations
secretly overheard. The Fourth Amendment itself shows that the
search is to be of tangible material things-the person, the house,
his papers, or his effects. The warrant calls for a description of the
things to be seized. The Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the sense of hearing and that only. There
was no entry of the houses or offices of defendants....
"Nor can we, without the sanction of Congressional enactment, agree that the courts have a discretion to exclude evidence,
the admission of which is not unconstitutional, because unethically
secured. A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence,
if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government
officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater
immunity than has been known heretofore."
It makes no difference in a federal prosecution, said the Supreme Court
in the Olmstead case, that the statute of the state makes it unlawful to intercept a message over a telephone line.9 Under the majority view, then,
the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution inhibited only the taking of tangible things and did not
preclude testimony concering voluntary conversations secretly overheard.
Wire tapping is neither unconstitutional, nor a federal crime, and evidence
so obtained is admissible in federal courts regardless of state penal laws
making wire tapping an offense.
7.
8.
9.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376
(1928).
Ibid., 277 U.S. at 464, 468,
Ibid.. 277 U.S. at 469.
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Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the dissenters, warned that:
... If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself .... 10
"'It is not the breakin of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right to personal security, personal
liberty, and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense....'""
"Every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as
evidence in a criminal proceed;g,, of facts ascertained by such2
intrusion must be deemed a violion of the Fifth Amendment."'
The dissenting justices, therefore, felt that the expression of thought into
speech, as contrasted with the expression of thought into writing, should
not divest the utterer of the constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, it
was held in some seven Courts of Appeal cases 18 that evidence was not
rendered inadmissible in a criminal prosecution in a federal court by the
fact that it was obtained by wire tapping. In two of these cases (as in
Olmstead) the wire tapping by which the evidence was obtained constituted a violation of the penal laws of the state.' 4 In Foley v. United States,
after holding that a person was not entitled to have a search warrant quashed and evidence obtained thereunder suppressed on the ground that the
information constituting the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant
was obtained by tapping a telephone line and intercepting messages without consent, the court stated: ". . . it is settled that the surreptitious eavesdropping of federal officers by secretly tapping telephone wires is no
worse than other eavesdropping, and does not require the discarding of
the information secured."' 1 Similarly, where one of several co-conspirators
called defendant by telephone and talked with him in the presence of a
government officer, who recognized defendant's voice and heard the conversation was admissible.' 6
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Ibid., 277 U.S. at 485.
Ibid., 277 U.S. at 474, 475.
Ibid., 277 US. at 478.
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. 2d 417 (CCA 4th 1931); Kerns v. United States, 50 F.2d
602 (CCA 6th 1931); Morton v. United States, 60 F. 2d 696 (CCA 7th 1932); Foley
v. United States, 64 F. 2d I (CCA 5th 1933); Bushouse v. United States, 67 F. 2d
843, 844 (CCA 6th 1933); Beard v. United States, 65 App. D.C. 231, 82 F. 2d 837
(1936); Valli v. United States, 94 F. 2d 687 (CCA 1st 1938).
Morton v. United States, 60 F. 2d 696, 700 (CCA 7th 1932); Valli v. United States,
94 F. 2d 692 (CCA 1st 1938).
Foley v. United States, 64 F. 2d 1, 4 (CCA 5th 1933).
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F. 2d 417 (CCA 4th 1951).

Noms
III
UNDER SECTION 60517 OF THE FEDE1RAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
A. THE SUPREME COURT TuRNs AWAY FROM THE OLMSTEAD CASE

The same policy problems as treated in the Olmstead case are still
present after the enactment of the Federal Communications Act. Section
605 is a somewhat feeble embodiment of what the majority of the court in
the Olmstead case had reference to when it said: "Congress may, of course,
protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence."' 8 It, therefore,
comes as somewhat of a surprise that despite the enactment of Section 605,
the federal courts at first continued .to follow the position taken by the
Supreme Court in the Olmstead decision. Quite significantly, in Smith v.
United States,19 decided after the passage of Section 605, the court denied,
on the authority of Olmstead v. United States, a contention that evidence
secured by wire tapping was inadmissible under Section 605; the court
seemingly regarding Section 605 as of no more effect than a state criminal
20
statute forbidding wire tapping. Likewise, in Beard v. United States,
the court followed the Olmstead case in holding that evidence secured by
wire tapping was admissible against defendant, charged with a gaming
offence.
But this reaffirmation was to be short-lived; for in Nardone v. United
States21 the Supreme Court decided that Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act applies to officers of the federal government, as well as
other persons, and renders inadmissible in a criminal trial in a federal
court evidence procured by such officers by tapping telephone wires and
intercepting messages. The Court stated:
"Taken at face value, the phrase 'no person' comprehends
Federal agents, and the ban on communication to 'any person'
bars testimony to the contents of an intercepted message .... To
recite the contents of 2a2 message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the message."
The government urged the court to construe Section 605 so as to exclude
federal agents, arguing that it was improbable that Congress intended to
hamper and impede the activities of the government in the detection and
punishment of crime. The Court replied that the question was one of
policy:
"Congress may have thought it less important that some
offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

no person not being authorized
47 U.S.C.A. sec. 605 reads in part as follows: "...
by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the meaning of such intercepted communication to any person....
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 465, 466.
Smith v. United States, 67 App. D.C. 251, 91 F. 2d 556 (1987).
Beard v. United States, 65 App. D.C. 231, 82 F. 2d 837 (1936).
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937).
Ibid., 302 U.S. at 381.
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resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty. The same consideration may
well have moved the Congress to adopt Section 605 as evoked
the guaranty against practices and procedures violative of privacy,
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal
embodied in the
2
Constitution." 3
On the second appeal 24 of the Nardone case, the Court held that Section
605 rendered inadrhissible not only evidence of conversations by telephones
obtained by wire tapping, but also evidence procured or made accessible
by the use of information so obtained. The Court declared:
"To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but
to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very
methods deemed 'inconsistent' with ethical standards and destructive of liberty."' 5
As a result of the two Nardone decisions, the Supreme Court seems to have
laid down a new doctrine which embraces the views of the four dissenting
justices in the Olmstead case. The Court seemed to consider the time
ripe for placing a harness upon what many believed to be a "dirty business."
These Nardone decisions represent a shift in the weighing of those values
discussed above. Now the scales were tipped against the threat of government wire tapping and in favor of the preservation of the individual's
rights to privacy.
But even after the first Nardone decision, other ways were invoked for
avoiding the proscription of the newly planted doctrine. Thus, in Valli v.
United States,26 intercepted messages of intrastate calls were held admissible. In United States v. Bonanzi,27 the court intimated that intrastate communications would be admissible. Similarly, in United States v.
Bruno,28 the admissibility of intrastate communications was given as an
alternative ground of decision.
A contrary result was reached in Diamond v. United States,29 Sablowsky
v. United States, and United States v. Plisco; in each of these cases evidence
relating to intercepted intrastate communications was excluded. In the
Sablowsky case, holding that Section 605 applied to intrastate communications as well as to interstate messages, the court stated:3 0
23.
24.

Ibid., 302 US. at 383.
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307 (1939). The
following passage is useful to illustrate the procedural requirement set out by the
Court: "The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to
the trial court's satisfaction that wire tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that
is established the trial judge must give opportunity to the accused to prove that a
substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This
leaves ample opportunity to the government to convince the trial court that its
proof had an independent origin."

25.

Ibid., 308 U.S. at 340.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Valli v. United States, 94 F. 2d 687, 691 (CCA 1st 1938).
United States v. Bonanzi, 94 F. 2d 570, 572 (CCA 2d 1938).
United States v. Bruno, 105 F. 2d 921, 923 (CCA 2d 1939); subsequently reversed
on other grounds, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S. Ct. 198, 84 L. Ed. 257 (1939).
Diamond v. United States, 108 F. 2d 859, 860 (CCA 6th 1938).
Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. 2d 183, 191 (CCA 3d 1938).

Noms
"... the ethical problem with which Congress was engaged
and which it apparently sought to solve by enacting Section 605 is
identical, whether the communication intercepted and offered in
evidence be interstate or intrastate in character. Nor would an
interpretation of that section commend itself to reason whereby
certain intercepted communications could be received in evidence
while others procured through the medium of an identical
tapped line would be inadmissible."
And in United States v. Plisco, the court declared:$'
".. . The ethical considerations that support the policy of
excluding intercepted interstate messages in the District of Columbia would seem to apply with equal force to intercepted local
messages."
Thus, there was a conflict of decisions in the lower federal Courts of
Appeals with regard to the admissibility of evidence secured by intercepting intrastate communications. An authoritative determination of this
matter was finally made by the United States Supreme Court in Weiss v.
United States,s2 where the government sought to introduce intercepted
intrastate communications as evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that
the interdiction of Section 605 was not limited to interstate and foreign
communications, but also rendered incompetent in a federal court evidence
obtained by the interception of intrastate communications. It reasoned
that "any communication" of necessity encompassed local communications,
because of the difficulty in dissecting interstate from intrastate communications, since both types of communication extend over the same lines. 83
The Court further ruled that voluntary testimony by one of the defendants
to the effect that the recording was correct, did not bring the case within
the exception in the statute for divulgence "authorized by the sender."
This apparently conclusive judicial determination against the use of
evidence obtained by the federal government by wire tapping was further
reinforced by subsequent decisions. 3 4 In United States v. Polakoff,35 the
Court strongly asserted that the consent to a recording of the conversation,
given by the party originating a telephone call, is not a divulgence within
the "consent exception" of Section 605. According to this case, although
there is no physical interruption of the circuit, a telephone conversation is
81.
32.
33.
34.

35.

United States v. Plisco, 22 F. Supp. 242, 244 (DC Dist. Col. 1938).
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S. Ct. 269, 84 L. Ed. 298 (1939).
Ibid., 308 U.S. at 327, 328.
United States v. Bernava, 95 F. 2d 310 (CCA 2d 1938); United States v. Reed,. 96
F. 2d 785 (CCA 2d 1938); Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. 2d 183 (CCA 3d 1938);
Ufiited States v. Klee, 101 F. 2d 191 (CCA 3d 1938); Diamond v. United States,
108 F. 2d 859 (CCA 6th 1938); United States v. Plisco, 22 F, Supp. 242 (DC Dist.
Col. 1938) ; United States v. Jenello, 102 F. 2d 587 (CCA 3d 1939) ;-United States v.
Polakoff, 112 F. 2d 888, 134 A.L.R. 607 (CCA 2d 1940); United States v. Fallon,
112 F. 2d 894 (CCA 2d 1940); United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (DSCD N.Y.
1940); United States v. Pillon, 36 F. Supp. 567 (DCED N.Y. 1941); James v. United
States, 191 F. 2d 472 (CA Dist. Col. 1951); Coplon v. United States,-191 F. 2d 749
(CA Dist. Col. 1951); United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925 (DCSD N.Y. 1951),
by implication; United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F. Supp. 934 (DCD Md. 1951), by
implication.
United States v. Polakoff, 112 F. 2d 888, 889, 134 A.L.R. 607 (CCA 2d 1940).
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"intercepted" within the meaning of Section 605 where it is recorded by
a device attached to an extension telephone. Since it is impossible satisfactorily to dissect a conversation, the privilege is mutual, so that both
parties must consent to the interception of any part of the conversation
to be within the exception of Section 605. This case was followed in
United States v. Fallon.86
B. THE SUPREME COURT TURNS BACK TOWARD THE OLMSTEAD CASE
Beginning with the case of United States v. Yee Ping Jong,8 7 there is
once again the reconsideration and the re-weighing of values, with the
pendulum swinging gradually back toward the Olmstead ruling, and a not
too inconsistent steering away from the declaration in the Nardone case.
In the Yee Ping Jong case the Court received evidence of a phonographic
record of a conversation between X and Y, the latter being a Chinese
interpreter and informer used by A, a government agent, in his investigation. At A's direction, Y called X on the telephone, the call being made
from the house of an associate of A. The device was attached to the telephone wire inside the house and by it the conversation was recorded upon
a prepared plate. The Court held, that the verb "intercept" means "to
take or seize by the way, or before arrival at the destined place" (Webster's
New International Dictionary, 2d Ed.), and does not aptly refer to a
communication which has reached its intended destination and is recorded
at one end of the line by one of the participants or by his direction.38 The
Court recognized that reasons of policy justify the making of telephone
communications privileged for the two parties involved; but do not justify
making them so privileged to one party as against use by the other. By
holding that "intercept" means to take or seize by the way, or before arrival
at the destined place, the Court seemed to whittle down the objection to
wire tapping as a logical development of the feeling against unlawful
search and seizure.
held

Three years later, in Goldstein v. United States, the Supreme Court
9
that:
"Even though use by prosecuting officers of intercepted telephone communications to induce witnesses to testify for the prosecution were a violation of Section 605, this would not render
testimony so procured inadmissible against one not a party to
the communications. . . . Section 605 is intended to protect only
the sender of a message against divulgence thereof."

In short, the Court held that one not a party to tapped conversations has no
standing to object to their use by the government to secure evidence.
According to the Court, assertion of the right under Section 605 is a per36.
37.
38.
39.

United States v. Fallon, 112 F. 2d 894 (CCA 2d 1940).
United States v. Yee Ping.Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (DCWD Pa. 1939).
Ibid., 26 F. Supp. at 70.
Goldstein v. United States, 316 US. 114, 122. 62 S. Ct. 1000, 1004, 86 L. Ed. 1312

(1942).

Nars
sonal right, similar to the assertion of the personal and constitutional right
to protection against unreasonable search and seizure, or against selfincrimination. Clearly, this result limits the effect of the Nardone ruling,
since the second Nardone decision literally outlawed the derivative use of
wire tapping.
In two other cases, Goldman v. United States and Shulman v. United
States,40 decided in the same year as the Goldstein case, wherein the prosecution was for conspiracy to violate the Bankruptcy Act, it was held that
recordings of defendant's conversation into a telephone receiver, obtained
by federal officers with the aid of a detectaphone (a super sensitive auditory
device) placed on the wall of an adjoining room, violated neither Section
605 nor the Fourth Amendment. Contrary to the tenor of the Nardone
decisions, the Court took the view that the protection intended and afforded
by Section 605 is of the means of communication and not of the secrecy of
the conversation. The Court reasoned that words spoken in a room in
the presence of another into a telephone receiver do not constitute a "communication" by wire under Section 605; that "interception" under the
same section indicates taking or seizing by the way or before arrival at the
destined place, and does not ordinarily connote obtaining of what is to be
sent before, or at the moment it leaves the possession of the proposesd
sender, or after, or at the moment, it comes into possession of the intended
receiver. 4 ' On the authority of the Olmstead case, the Court held that the
use of a dectectaphone in such circumstances does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. On the authority of the Goldstein and
Goldman decisions, the federal government could use wire tapped matter
to induce testimony against an accused so long as he was not a party to
the intercepted conversations; or by use of a dectectaphone at either end
of the communication, recordings could be made and used in evidence in
federal prosecutions even though the accused was a party to the conversation. The significance of the decisions cannot be overemphasized. The
net effect was to weaken greatly the authority of the Nardone rulings, and
to indicate a return to the Olmstead doctrine. As additional evidence of
this so-called "retreat" or shift in policy, the court in United States v.
Lewis42 held that the action of deputy marshals in answering a number of
incoming telephone calls after raiding the premises, listening to what the
party calling said, and participating in the conversation did not constitute
an "interception" within Section 605, so as to render the evidence obtained
thereby inadmisible in a subsequent criminal prosecution. To substitute
oneself for the receiver of the telephone call, said the court, is not an
interception. The same result was reached in Billeci v. United States.43 In
40.

Goldman v. United States and Shulman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct.

993, 86 L. Ed. 1322 (1942).
41. Ibid., 316 U.S. at 133, 134.
42. United States v. Lewis, 184 F. 2d 394 (CA Dist. Col. 1950).
43. Billici v. United States, 87 App. D.C. 274, 184 F. 2d 394 (1950).
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Casey v. United States,4 4 it was held that Section 605 refers to communications over licensed facilities, and its protection does not cover communications which are themselves illegal; and, therefore, in a prosecution for
operating a radio station without either a station or operator's license, it
was not error to admit in evidence the substance of radio messages between
defendants.
The most recent expression of the Supreme Court on the principal
issue is in the case of'Ong Lee v. United States.4 5 In that case, a Chinese
laundryman, suspected of selling narcotics, was visited in his shop by an
old acquaintance. During the ensuing conversation the laundryman made
incriminating statements which unbeknown to him were being picked up
by a radio transmitter concealed on the person of the acquaintance and
which were being transmitted to a government agent who was stationed
outside the laundry with a receiving set. At the trial and over defendant's
objection the government agent was permitted to testify as to what he
heard by using the receiving set. In reaffirming the Olmstead and Gold man
decisions, the Court held that the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth
Amendment inhibit only the taking of tangible things and do not preclude
testimony concerning voluntary conversations secretly overheard. 46 Therefore, eavesdropping on a conversastion, with the connivance of one of the
parties, is not an unreasonable search and seizure, even though such eavesdropping is made possible by means of a receiver which is tuned to the
microphone hidden on the person of the conniving party. Moreover, there
was no violation of Section 605, since there was no interference with any
communications facility which defendant was entitled to use, and defendant
was not sending messages to anybody or using a system of communications
within Section 605. Federal courts, said the Supreme Court, will not discipline federal law enforcement. officers where there has been no violation
47
of a federal law.

What, then is the status of the law in the federal courts today with
regard to' our problem?4 8 It would seem that eavesdropping by federal
officials through the use of communications devices is not ipso facto -a
violation of the Fourth Amendment nor of Section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. As a matter of evidence, the federal courts
have not always been consistent in their attitude toward the policy problem
of whether they should be more concerned with how the evidence was
obtained, or with what the evidence is. The tendency is apparently to
enlarge the domain of competency, and to submit to the jury for their
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Casey v. United States, 191 F. 2d 1, 4 (CA 9th 1951), subsequently reversed on the
Solicitor General's confession of error as to the proper interpretation of the facts,
343 U.S. 808, 72 S. Ct. 999, 96 L. Ed. 924 (1952).
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S. Ct. 967, 96 L. Ed. 770 (1952).
Ibid., 72 S. Ct. at 972.
Ibid., 72 S. Ct. at 972.
For a discussion of the federal and state legislation and court decisions. of a survey
of newspaper opinion of wire tapping, of wire tapping experience under the New
York system, of the technical aspects of wire tapping, and of a proposed wire
tapping act, see Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem, 52 Col. L. Rev. (1952).

NOTES

consideration those matters which heretofore were excluded. These methods
of obtaining evidence ought to be regarded as raising, not questions of
49
law, but questions as to which witness to believe.
IV
AN EXERCISE IN SPECULATION

Would evidence obtained by Wyoming state law enforcement officers
by eavesdropping by the use of induction coils, telephone extension lines,
wire, tape or sound recorders, dictaphones, detectaphones, or "walky-talkies"
be admissible in the Wyoming state courts in a prosecution for a state
offence? The determination of this question must ultimately rest on the
Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of a state constitutional provision
and a state statute. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been expressly incorporated and set out in the Wyoming Constitution.5 0 Also, Wyoming has a statute which makes wire tapping a
felony and regulates the use or disclosure of information so obtained. 51
If the Wyoming Supreme Court were to follow the Olmstead doctrine,
then, clearly, the evidence so obtained would not constitute an unlawful
search and seizure within the meaning of the Wyoming Constitution. If,
however, the Court were to hold that wire tapping constitutes an unlawful
search and seizure, the Wyoming Supreme Court has already indicated
that the evidence illegally obtained would be inadmissible because the
admission of such evidence would violate the state constitutional provision
protecting one against self-incrimination. 5 2 The majority of state court
decisions on this question in other states, in the absence of statute, seem
to follow the view of the majority in the Court in Olmstead v. United States
to the effect that evidence that is otherwise competent is not rendered
inadmissible by the fact that it was obtained by means of wire tapping or
intercepting communications. 5 3 As evidence of the majority state view,
49.
50.

51.

52.
53.

On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S. Ct. at 974 (1952).
Wyo. Const. Art. I, Sec. 4 reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be
seized."
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 9-1921 reads as follows: "Whoever shall wilfully and
maliciously . . . tap, or make any connection with, or read, or copy by use of
telegraph or telephone instruments, or otherwise, in any unauthorized manner,
any message . .. rom any telegraph or telephone line, wire or cable, so unlawfully
.* tapped in this state; or make unauthorized use of the same, or who shall
wilfully and maliciously prevent, obstruct, or delay, by any means of contrivance
whatsoever, the sending, conveyance, or delivery, in this state, of. any authorized
communication . . . by or through any telegraph or telephone line, cable, or wire,
under the control of any telegraph or telephone company doing business in this
state; or who shall wilfully and maliciously aid, agree with, employ, or conspire
with any other person to do any of the aforementioned unlawful acts . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00)
nor more than five-hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for not more than five (5) years or both."
State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342, 13 A.L.R. 1284 (1920).
See Note, 134 A.L.R. 614 (1941).
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the court in Adams v. New York cited Greenleaf with approval, to the
effect that the admissibility of documentary evidence tending to establish
the guilt of an accused of the offense charged is not affected because it
was obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against un54
reasonable search and seizure.
.In more than one instance Section 605 has been held not to apply to
prosecutions in state courts. 55 Although the Wyoming statute forbidding
wire tapping is located in a chapter of the state code dealing with crimes
labelled "Offences Against Public Utilities," it has been held in other
states 56 having statutes similar to that of Wyoming, that such statutes are
designed to protect the secrecy of communications and the subscriber's
right of privacy. In Arizona, where a statute 57 similar to that of Wyoming
is operative, a state court held that the use of a dictograph to overhear
conversations spoken into a telephone receiver does not violate the wiretapping law. 58 If argument" by analogy can have any validity, then the
.Arizona decision should at least serve as a stepping stone for the Wyoming
Supreme Court. It should be noted that disclosure is not absolutely forbidden in the Wyoming statute; 59 but instead, it is onily an unauthorized
use of wire tapped information which is prohibited. Would a reasonable
construction of the Wyoming statute allow wire tapped information to be
used in the courts, or exempt state public officials? The Wyoming Supreme
Court has never had occasion to enterpret the statute. Whatever interpretation may be given the statute, one thing is certain: the language of the
Wyoming statute is most awkward and would be extremely difficult to
apply to the modern scientific means used by eavesdroppers.6 0
GEORGE M.
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The question of whether or not an arrest is lawful may be raised in a
variety of ways." The arrested person may apply for release from custody
by writ of habeaus corpus, or bring a civil action for damages resulting
54.
55.
56.

People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636, 638 (1903); See also Hubin v. State,
180 Md. 279, 23 A. 2d 706 (1942).
Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A. 2d 753, 758 (1939); Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279,
23 A. 2d 706, 709 (1942); People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal. 2d 193, 137 P. 2d 437, 438
(1943); People v. Kelly, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P. 2d 1, 4 (1943).
People v. Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 171 P. 2d 1, 4 (1946).

57.

Ariz. Code Ann. 1939 secs. 43-5403, 43-5405.

58.

State v. Behringer, 19 Ariz. 502, 172 Pac. 660 (1918).

59.
60.

Several states, notably New York, have laws which permit the use of wire tapping
pursuant to court order under a procedure similar to that required for a search
warrant. New York Constitution Art. I, Sec. 12; Code of Crii. Procedure, sec. 813a.
For an excellent visual illustration of the use of these mechanical, electrical, and
video devices by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, see the movie entitled. "Walk
East on Beacon," which is currently showing nation-wide.

1. Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 Texas L. Rev. 279 (1946).

